This is a sample: our own domain’s report, exactly as QuantGuard™ wrote it. Yours looks the same.
quantguard.co.uk
The website uses hybrid post-quantum key exchange for current browsers.
Endpoints and score
| Category | Weight | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Web key exchange | 50.0% | 100 |
| Certificates and signatures | 18.8% | 100 |
| Protocol and cipher hygiene | 18.8% | 100 |
| Email (DNS-based) | 6.2% | 36 |
| DNS / DNSSEC | 6.2% | 100 |
Not assessed: SSH / remote access, Identity / JWKS, Discovery coverage. Their weight moves to the rest.
6 findings, most severe first
DMARC policy doesn't enforce (p=none) quantguard.co.uk Low hygiene
- dmarc
- v=DMARC1; p=none;
Spoofed mail is reported but still delivered.
How to fix: Publish a DMARC record (`_dmarc` TXT) and move to `p=quarantine` or `p=reject` once reports show legitimate mail is aligned.
No MTA-STS policy quantguard.co.uk Low hygiene
Mail sent to this domain can be downgraded to an unencrypted connection by an attacker on the network path.
How to fix: Publish MTA-STS (a `_mta-sts` TXT record and a policy at `https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt`) so sending servers require TLS.
Certificates use classical signatures (ECDSA secp256r1) all HTTPS endpoints Info not yet possible
- leaf key types
- ECDSA secp256r1
A quantum computer could one day forge these signatures, but only at the time of an attack, so this isn't a harvest-now risk. Publicly trusted CAs don't yet issue post-quantum (ML-DSA) certificates for the web, so this can't be fixed today and doesn't lower the score.
How to fix: No action now. Keep certificate renewal automated so you can switch when post-quantum certificates become available.
Mail is handled by Namecheap hosting quantguard.co.uk Info hygiene
- mx
- mx1-hosting.jellyfish.systems, mx2-hosting.jellyfish.systems, mx3-hosting.jellyfish.systems
Identified from the domain's MX records.
How to fix: No action required.
No TLS-RPT record quantguard.co.uk Info hygiene
You won't hear about senders failing to connect securely.
How to fix: Publish a TLS-RPT record (`_smtp._tls` TXT, `v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:...`) to receive TLS failure reports.
The obsolete X25519Kyber768Draft00 group is also accepted quantguard.co.uk:443/https, www.quantguard.co.uk:443/https Info legacy draft
- legacy pq groups
- X25519Kyber768Draft00
Current clients negotiate the standard X25519MLKEM768; the draft group is only a compatibility leftover. Cloudflare's edge accepts it for older clients; there's nothing to change.
How to fix: No action required.
Every algorithm QuantGuard™ saw
| Algorithm | Used for | Posture | Migrate to |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecdsa-with-SHA384 | CA certificate signature | quantum-vulnerable | ML-DSA (when public CAs issue it) |
| sha256WithRSAEncryption | CA certificate signature | quantum-vulnerable | ML-DSA (when public CAs issue it) |
| secp256r1 | key exchange | quantum-vulnerable | X25519MLKEM768 |
| x25519 | key exchange | quantum-vulnerable | X25519MLKEM768 |
| ECDSA secp256r1 | leaf certificate key | quantum-vulnerable | ML-DSA (when public CAs issue it) |
| ecdsa-with-SHA384 | leaf certificate signature | quantum-vulnerable | ML-DSA (when public CAs issue it) |
| X25519Kyber768Draft00 | key exchange | legacy draft | X25519MLKEM768 |
| X25519MLKEM768 | key exchange | hybrid PQ | no change needed |
| TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | cipher | symmetric, sound | no change needed |
Now check your own domain
A readiness indicator based on what is publicly observable at the time of the scan. It is not a security guarantee or a compliance certification.